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Introduction
What a difference a new election cycle makes. Interest
groups typically play an important role as attack dogs
in federal campaigns. After being somewhat less noticeable in the 2008 presidential election, interest groups
announced their presence loudly in the 2012 campaign.
This essay compares interest group activity in the 2012
federal elections with the previous two cycles. We examine
the role of interest groups in financing campaign activities
and influencing voters.
The dominant feature of the interest group milieu
during the 2012 cycle was the explosive growth of the independent expenditure-only Super PAC. Unlike traditional
PACs, these committees are not allowed to donate to, or
coordinate their expenditures with, campaigns or parties
that they support. But more importantly – and also unlike
traditional PACs but like their predecessors, 527s, sonamed for the special tax code provision allowing them –
Super PACs are allowed to accept unlimited donations. This

allowed them, in many cases, to overwhelm the spending
of actual candidates and exert outsized influence on races,
and to do so in ways that continually pushed the envelope
regarding the definition of “coordination.”

Defining Coordination
Although many scholars, journalists, and practitioners
did their best to explain this new Wild West environment,
no one was able to distill it quite as well as comedian
Stephen Colbert. Colbert satirized the concept of ”independently” operating Super PACs by plotting on air with
Trevor Potter, former Federal Election Commission chairman, to transfer the reins of his amply-funded Super PAC
so that it could support his impending presidential candidacy. Potter informed Colbert that anyone other than
Colbert could run such a PAC, provided they did not coordinate on strategy:
“Well, I wouldn’t want to even create the appearance of electoral skullduggery,” said Colbert, “but I think I know just the
guy.”
Suddenly, Jon Stewart appeared on stage. Colbert and Stewart
asked Potter if the fact that they were already business partners
would prohibit Stewart from running the PAC.
“Being business partners does not count as coordination,
legally,” Potter replied.
“I assume there’s reams of complicated paperwork to be executed before we transfer over the reins of power of something as
critical to our democracy as this?” Stewart deadpanned.
“I brought the document with me,” replied Potter, handing
Stewart a single sheet of paper which named the new entity,
“Definitely Not Coordinating with Stephen Colbert Super PAC.”
“Now that I have the Super PAC, may I legally hire his current
staff to produce these ads that will be in no way coordinated
with Stephen?”
“Yes,” said Potter, “as long as they have no knowledge of
Colbert’s plans.”
Colbert thought for a moment and concluded, “OK, from now
on I’ll have to just talk about my plans on my television show
and just take the risk that you might watch it.”

When Colbert mocked the ease with which campaigns
are able to circumvent the laws prohibiting coordination
with Super PACs, he had no idea that real-world events
would quickly seem more surreal than his satire. For
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instance, just before his breakthrough victory in the South
Carolina primary, Newt Gingrich met privately with benefactor Sheldon Adelson at Adelson’s Las Vegas resort.
Adelson and his wife had recently donated $11 million
to a Gingrich-supporting Super PAC called Winning Our
Future (not to be confused with Romney-backed Restore
Our Future PAC, whose fundraisers Romney himself sometimes attended). Gingrich and Adelson emerged from their
meeting and insisted that they did not discuss Winning
Our Future. Days later, Adelson contributed another
$5 million (Haberman 2012). Adelson actually donated
more to Winning Our Future than Gingrich’s official presidential campaign committee raised during his entire candidacy (Allen and Adelson 2012).
Gingrich was not alone in relying on a single donor
to keep his presidential campaign afloat – or in stretching the bounds of credulity in asserting that neither
he nor his campaign had coordinated with his Super
PAC. When Rick Santorum’s campaign could not afford
a single television ad in the run-up to February 7 contests in Minnesota, Missouri, and Colorado, billionaire
donor Foster Freiss stepped up to the plate with a sevenfigure donation to Santorum’s Red, White, and Blue
Super PAC, which ran ads that helped power Santorum
to victory over Mitt Romney in all three states. As with
Adelson and Winning Our Future, Friess’s donations
comprised the bulk of support received by Red, White,
and Blue (Rutenberg and Confessore 2012 ). And Freiss
seemed even less concerned than Adelson about potential accusations of illicit coordination: while underwriting Red, White, and Blue’s ad campaign, Freiss traveled
with Santorum on his campaign bus for 3 weeks.
Of course, these campaigns may well have avoided
actual coordination. Savvy operatives – with the aid of
election-law attorneys – argue that it is relatively easy to
comply with the law even while achieving the ultimate
goal of coordinating attacks on opponents. One method
pioneered by the National Republican Congressional
Committee in 2010 was to release advertising plans
publicly, allowing independent groups to run their own
advertisements in a way that would complement the
NRCC’s ads (Vogel and Smith 2011).
Although Democrats essentially ceded the Super PAC
terrain to Republicans during the 2010 cycle, President
Obama’s wink and nod brought them onto the field in February 2011. Democrats quickly learned to “coordinate without
coordinating” in many of the same ways Republicans did.
In one unique case, they took it to a new level: while John
Lapp ran the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee’s traditional independent expenditure effort (a PAC
bound by limited contributions), his wife Ali ran House
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Majority PAC (the Super PAC charged with an identical
mission but able to accept unlimited contributions).
In one striking product, the DCCC operation aired an
ad attacking the Republican candidate for a New York
congressional seat, followed almost immediately by a
similar House Majority PAC spot. Though the ads cited
the same line from a Wall Street Journal article asserting that the Republican candidate’s budget plan “ would
essentially end Medicare,” Ali assured a reporter that
she and her husband never discussed campaign strategies because they had other things to talk about. “John
and I were much more excited about the serious progress our 2 ½ year old made in potty training that day,”
she said (Vogel and Smith 2011).
As the cases of Sheldon Adelson and Foster Freiss
illustrate, the alpha males of independent expenditures
announced their presence during the Republican nomination contest. Wealthy donors helped lift outside spending to drastically higher levels in 2012. The more relaxed
campaign finance environment that exists in the wake
of recent Supreme Court decisions may blur the lines
between candidates and outside groups when it comes
to prominent politicians and their affiliated Super PACs.
However, in congressional elections the surge of outside
spending may be shifting the balance of power in campaigns away from candidates toward organized interests.

Financing Election Activities
Each federal election cycle tends to break the campaign
spending record set in the previous cycle, and 2012 was no
different. Interest groups typically engage in two major election finance activities: 1) donating money to candidates and
parties, and 2) outside spending on their own campaign
advertising. After the 2008 election, we predicted that interest groups would continue to challenge campaign finance
restrictions in court, especially those codified in BCRA
(Kimball 2009, 9). This proved correct in 2010, when the
Supreme Court struck down part of BCRA and enabled corporations and unions to fund electioneering activities directly
from their treasuries in the Citizens United case. While there
is some dispute about the impact of the Citizens United decision (Goldstein, Schweidel, and Wittenwyler 2012; Herrnson,
Deering, and Wilcox 2012), there has been a clear surge of
independent expenditure activity since the decision.
With the important caveat that the 2012 campaign
finance totals may increase as final reports come in
after the end of the year, Table 1 compares the campaign
finance activities of interest groups and presidential
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Table 1 Federal election spending by interest groups and presidential candidates, 2004–2012.
Election cycle
PAC contributions to federal candidates
Non-party outside spending
Presidential candidate spending
Total spending on federal elections

2004

2008

2012

$320 million (8%)
$191 million (5%)
$880.5 million (21%)
$4.2 billion (100%)

$425 million (8%)
$286 million (5%)
$1.7 billion (32%)
$5.3 billion (100%)

$400 million (7%)
$1.1 billion (18%)
$1.4 billion (23%)
$6 billion ($100%)

Sources: Refs. (Ashkenas et al. 2012; Center for Responsive Politics 2012a,b,c; Franz 2013).

candidates during the last three election cycles. Traditionally, interest groups have sought to influence federal
elections by forming a PAC and making contributions
to their favored candidates. The catch is that traditional
PACs have to comply with limits on the donations that
individuals and other committees make to the PAC.
Table 1 indicates that in the 2004 and 2008 cycles, PAC contributions to federal candidates constituted the dominant
form of interest group spending, far outpacing non-party
outside spending (such as independent expenditures on
television ads). PAC contributions also exceeded outside
spending in the 2010 midterm election cycle (Herrnson,
Deering, and Wilcox 2012; Franz 2013). However, that relationship is turned on its head in 2012, as the roughly $1.1
billion in outside spending more than doubled the $400
million spent on PAC contributions. This is due primarily to the dramatic growth in outside spending in 2012.
Although the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of
2002 did not raise contribution limits for PAC donations
to candidates (as it did for individual contributions), total
PAC contributions to federal candidates reached similar
amounts in 2008 and 2012. In each of the election cycles,
PAC contributions comprise a similar share of total campaign spending in federal elections. Instead, it is the dramatic growth in outside spending that jumps out of Table
1, increasing from 5% of federal spending in 2004 and
2008 to 18% of federal spending in 2012. The 2012 election extends a trend of increasing interest group activity,
even exceeding the share of federal campaign spending
by political parties (Franz 2013).
Presidential candidate spending accounts for a similar
share of total spending in 2004 and 2012, the two cycles
with an incumbent president running for re-election.
Candidate spending was a larger share of the pie in 2008
when both parties had open contests for the presidential
nomination. Comparing candidate and interest group
spending in Table 1 is instructive as well. Overall interest group spending appears to exceed presidential candidate spending in 2012 after falling well short of candidate
spending in the previous two cycles. Outside groups spent
almost $100 million in the final week of the presidential

campaign (Merlin 2012). This may indicate a shift in the
balance of campaign messages that voters receive in
federal elections. In certain contests, voters may see more
ads from outside groups than from the candidates.
In the wake of the Citizens United decision, several
organized interests formed Super PACs or other entities (501(c) or 527 groups) designed to accept unlimited
donations from corporate or union treasuries or wealthy
benefactors. Super PACs basically did not exist prior to
Citizens United, but over one thousand had formed by
the end of the 2012 election cycle. One consequence of the
rapid growth of Super PACs is a blurring of the distinction
between candidates and outside groups in campaigns.
For example, Restore Our Future, the prominent Super
PAC supporting Mitt Romney, was formed by several staff
members from Romney’s 2008 presidential campaign.
Priorities USA Action, a leading Democratic Super PAC
that spent most of its budget on ads criticizing Mitt Romney’s tenure at Bain Capital, was headed by Bill Burton,
a veteran of President Obama’s 2008 campaign and the
White House press office (Franz 2013).
Overall, Super PACs spent more than $640 million on
federal races in 2012.1 There are several parallels between
the 2012 and 2004 cycles in terms of outside spending. The
Super PACs in 2012 continued a pattern of outside groups
trying to bring the challenger to parity with the presidential incumbent. In 2004, outside spending by unions and
other liberal groups helped compensate for John Kerry’s
financial deficit against the Bush campaign (Institute of
Politics 2004, 213). In 2008, however, outside groups did
not help Republicans overcome Obama’s massive spending advantage over John McCain.
Anticipating another financial juggernaut from the
Obama reelection campaign in 2012, Republican leaders
and allied groups seemed determined to avoid a repeat
of 2008. The Super PACs on the Republican side with
the largest expenditures in 2012 were Restore Our Future
1 The spending totals for Super PACs and individual groups below
come from The Center for Responsive Politics (http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/index.php, accessed December 14, 2012).
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($143 million) and American Crossroads ($105 million),
founded by Karl Rove and Ed Gillespie, key players in the
presidential campaigns of George W. Bush. The biggest
Super PACs supporting Democratic candidates in 2012
included Priorities USA Action ($66 million) and Majority PAC ($38 million), founded by former staff to Senate
Majority Leader Harry Reid.
It appears that 501(c) groups constituted a larger
portion of outside spending activity in 2012 than in previous cycles, likely due to the appeal of weaker disclosure
requirements for 501(c) organizations (Franz 2012). Some
Super PACs or traditional PACs formed 501(c) affiliates in
order to shield the identity of donors. In 2012, the biggest
501(c) organizations on the GOP side included American
Crossroads affiliate Crossroads GPS ($71 million) and
Americans for Prosperity ($39 million), heavily supported
by Charles and David Koch and the US Chamber of Commerce ($36 million). There were no Democratic-supporting 501(c) organizations that spent that much money in
the 2012 cycle.
Outside spending helped the Republican Party level
the financial playing field in the 2012 presidential election. Table 2 shows the total spending in the presidential
campaign by the candidate, national party, and outside
groups. Despite Mitt Romney’s fundraising prowess, if
he had been left on his own, he would have been badly
outspent by the Obama campaign. However, spending by
the national GOP and, especially, outside groups, allowed
the Republican side to slightly outspend the Democrats
in the presidential campaign. Despite the overall spending parity, Obama still enjoyed two significant financial
advantages over Romney in the 2012 campaign.
First, Obama faced no opposition for the Democratic
nomination while Romney and the Restore Our Future
Super PAC spent significant resources to win the Republican nomination. Thus, the Democratic side probably
outspent the GOP during the final 6 months of the presidential campaign. Second, the “lowest unit rate” rule for
campaign advertising applies to candidate ads but not to
party or interest group ads. Since a much higher portion of
the spending on the Democratic side came from the Obama
campaign, they were able to take greater advantage of the
Table 2 Spending on the 2012 presidential election by source.
Source
Candidate
Party
Outside spending
Total

Obama

Romney

$684 million (61%)
$286 million (25%)
$155 million (14%)
$1.1 billion (100%)

$433 million (34%)
$379 million (29%)
$478 million (37%)
$1.32 billion (100%)

Source: Ref. (Center for Responsive Politics 2012d).
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lower ad rates. As a result, the Democrats were able to
air more television ads than the Republicans in the final
months of the presidential campaign (Wesleyan Media
Project 2012).

The Impact of Outside Spending
While it is early to make very definitive assessments about
the impact of interest groups in the 2012 election, we do
offer some tentative ideas about areas where interest
group activity likely had some influence. We begin with
the Republican presidential nominating contest described
above. Typically, when candidates for a party nomination
run low on funds or fare poorly in primaries or caucuses,
they are forced to drop out of the race (Polsby et al. 2012,
111). In 2012, the Super PACs supporting Gingrich and Santorum helped those two candidates survive longer than
otherwise would have been the case. It is difficult to prove
this counterfactual, but we suggest examining two somewhat comparable candidates from the 2008 Republican
nomination contest as a thought experiment.
Rudy Giuliani raised much more money in 2008 than
Newt Gingrich did in 2012. But Giuliani finished sixth in
Iowa and fourth in New Hampshire and dropped out of the
race by the end of January. Gingrich saw his staff resign en
masse in the summer of 2011, and he followed that up by
finishing fourth in the Iowa caucuses and fifth in the New
Hampshire primary. Yet Gingrich did not withdraw from
the race until early May of 2012.
Mike Huckabee raised a bit less in 2008 than Rick Santorum did in 2012. While both candidates finished first by a
close margin in Iowa and both won roughly 12% of the delegates to the national convention, Huckabee withdrew from
the race in early March, while Santorum campaigned until
the middle of April. Could Gingrich and Santorum have survived as long as they did without a Super PAC? One observer
likened the GOP candidates challenging Mitt Romney in
2012 to “zombie candidates” who were being “kept alive” by
their Super PACs (Schmitt 2012). The pro-Romney Super PAC
needed to spend $40 million to help dispatch those candidates. To further make this point, it appears that potential 2016 presidential candidates are already seeking the
support of wealthy Super PAC donors (Vogel 2012a).
We can also examine the impact of interest groups
in the general elections of 2012. Some observers note the
heavy outside spending by pro-GOP groups that targeted
the presidential contest and several Senate seats. Since the
Democrats gained two seats (and retained their majority) in
the Senate and President Obama was reelected, this outside
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spending is sometimes described as a “bad investment”
(Eggen and Farnam 2012). While American elections are a
bottom-line enterprise judged by wins and losses, it is hasty
to evaluate interest group activity in 2012 by that criterion
alone. As noted above, outside spending by conservative
groups in the presidential contest was mainly intended to
mute the large financial advantage of the Obama campaign.
At the same time, we do have reason to question the
efficacy of some conservative independent expenditure
efforts. Both individual mega-donors and national groups
made decisions that even at the time seemed vexing. First
and most widely mocked, casino mogul Adelson dropped
as much as $150 million overall during the cycle and nearly
all of his favored candidates lost. He pumped $10 million
into Gingrich’s Winning Our Future vehicle after Gingrich
had effectively lost the primary campaign (Hoffman 2012;
Resnikoff 2012; Smith and Cramer 2012).
Second, some outside groups underestimated the
logistical challenges of grassroots mobilization, a far
more complex process than simply contracting with a
media consultant to produce television ads. One journalist who spent time in the field with Americans for
Prosperity (AFP) canvassers chronicled the following
complications in just a single afternoon: 1) the expectation that senior citizen volunteers could operate tablet
computers 2) the inclusion of strong Obama supporters
on canvassing lists; 3) the inclusion of businesses on canvassing lists; 4) the loss of battery power for the tablets
on which voter information was stored after just 1 hour of
canvassing (Weigel 2012). While AFP spent $62 million on
the ground, in addition to millions spent by Ralph Reed’s
Faith and Freedom Coalition and Dick Armey’s FreedomWorks, there was little evidence of success on Election
Day. Turnout among historically Republican groups
(most notably, rural whites) was down from 2004 and
even 2008, when the Republican base was uninspired by
moderate nominee John McCain (Trende 2012).
Finally – and this is the challenge inherent in uncoordinated expenditures – the messaging by conservative outside groups sometimes seemed to miss the mark.
Whereas Obama-supporting Priorities USA focused like
a laser on working-class Ohioans with the message that
Romney was a callous “vulture capitalist,” to borrow
Rick Perry’s pungent phrase, messaging by conservative outside groups was all over the map – literally and
figuratively. First of all, some groups such as the American
Future Fund dumped millions into states Romney never
seriously contested, such as Minnesota, Michigan, and
Pennsylvania ( Joseph 2012; King 2012). Others stressed
messages that seemed more aligned with the pet issues of
donors than the concerns of voters. One rival Super PAC

operative hissed that Americans for Prosperity’s messaging was determined by “whatever the Koch brothers had
for breakfast” (Smith and Cramer 2012).
The diffusion of responsibility characteristic of the
2012 conservative independent expenditure model meant
that often an array of disparate and even conflicting
messages simultaneously bombarded voters. Before the
Republican convention, the Romney campaign pushed
what seemed like its most effective ad of the cycle, attacking Obama on welfare reform. That very week, American
Crossroads whacked Obama on the deficit, Restore Our
Future on jobs, and Americans for Prosperity on Solyndra. At one point, the American Future Fund spent $4
million to portray Obama as a crony capitalist, contradicting the widespread conservative depiction of Obama
as a “socialist” (Smith and Cramer 2012).

Moving Down the Ballot
Another notable trend in interest group activity during
the 2012 cycle was the movement of big money down
the ballot. In the pre-Citizens United era, almost all 527
activity, such as that of 2004’s George Soros-funded entity
America Votes and the infamous Swift Boat Veterans for
Truth, occurred at the presidential level. The 2012 election
marked an upheaval. Interest group activity exploded in
congressional campaigns after courts struck down BCRA
restrictions on outside spending.
In many races, Republican-supporting Super PACs
spent far more on television ads than both candidates
combined, not to mention millions of dollars spent by
Americans for Prosperity on grassroots mobilization efforts
(Vogel and Isenstadt 2011). One reporter, focusing on a
House race in the rural South in which Super PACs made
$9 million dollars of independent expenditures, wondered
if American politics had reached a “new normal” in which
power, control, and top-flight talent have abandoned party
committees and candidates to join flush outside groups
not bound by donation limits (Vogel 2012b).
In 2012, more than $5 million in independent expenditures was made in 13 Senate races, basically all of the
competitive seats.2 Since Republicans were trying to
regain a Senate majority, much of the outside spending
from conservative groups was directed at races where a
Democratic incumbent or a strong Democratic open seat
candidate had significantly outraised the GOP challenger.
2 Data on outside spending in 2012 Senate races come from the Sunlight Foundation (http://reporting.sunlightfoundation.com/outsidespending/candidates/, accessed December 19, 2012).

Smith and Kimball: Barking Louder: Interest Groups in the 2012 Election

3 Some observers have explained the outcome of the presidential
election by finding fault with the Romney campaign and candidacy
[e.g., (Hamburger 2012)]. However, Romney received more votes than
the GOP Senate candidate in 27 of 33 states with a Senate race. If
Romney was such a bad candidate then most of the Republican Senate candidates were subpar as well.
4 We exclude Senate races without a major party candidate and we
exclude races with a prominent third party or Independent candidate.

in federal elections reached its highest point (Franz 2013,
20); and the 2008 and 2012 elections, when interest
group activity in Senate races has been unusually high
(Franz 2013, 21). Since we are mainly interested in the
impact of candidates, we plot the estimated coefficient for
candidate spending for each time period in Figure 1.
As Figure 1 indicates, the relationship between candidate spending and vote share in US Senate races is noticeably weaker in the two most recent election cycles than
in previous elections. Prior to 2008 we get model coefficients around 0.40, indicating that each percentage point
increase in a candidate’s share of campaign spending is
associated with a 0.4% point increase in vote share. But in
2008 and 2012 the candidate spending coefficient drops to
0.26. These findings suggest that the recent explosion in
interest group spending in Senate races has reduced the
impact candidates might have on their election outcomes.
The shift could also be a result of increased partisanship
in the electorate (the coefficient on the presidential vote
share increases in size in the most recent period). While
these results are tentative and circumstantial, they merit
further investigation to determine whether the balance
of power in Senate elections is shifting away from candidates toward interest groups.

Playing in Primaries
Another noteworthy trend involves increased financial
activity by outside groups during the primary season.
Since 2004, when outside groups spent $3 million and
$2 million, respectively, to influence Senate and House
primary elections, the numbers have steadily escalated.
In this cycle, outside groups spent $27 million and
0.5
Candidate spending coefficient

Conservative outside spending may have been perceived
as being more effective in 2010 Senate races because it was
tilting the playing field toward Republican candidates. In
2012, however, outside spending by conservative groups
was mainly attempting to level the playing field.
For example, in challenging Democratic incumbent Sherrod Brown in Ohio, Josh Mandel was outspent
by roughly $4 million. Meanwhile, outside spending
on Mandel’s behalf exceeded outside spending by proBrown groups by $9 million. While Mandel still lost the
Ohio Senate race, the outside spending likely helped him
fare better than if he had been left to fend for himself. A
related difficulty for pro-Republican groups in 2012 is that
Republicans nominated weak candidates in a couple of
key Senate races in Missouri and Indiana.3
Beyond wins and losses, outside spending may alter
the relationship between a candidate’s campaign and the
electorate in several ways. Outside spending tends to fund
substantially more negative messages than candidate
advertising (Wesleyan Media Project 2012), so outside
spending may change the tone of campaigns. Outside
spending may also alter the campaign agenda and mobilize additional voters. Outside spending may force candidates to devote more time to campaign fundraising,
encouraging more of an arms race in campaign finance.
More fundamentally, outside spending may weaken the
impact of the candidate’s campaign on the outcome.
We examine this possibility in Senate elections held
during presidential cycles since 1980. Typically a candidate’s share of campaign spending is a good predictor of
the candidate’s share of the vote in congressional elections [e.g., (Burden and Kimball 2002)]. Candidate fundraising reflects, to some extent, the judgments of donors
about which aspirants are high-quality candidates. We
estimate a regression equation with the Democratic proportion of the two-party vote in the Senate election as the
dependent variable and two independent variables.
The main independent variable is the Democrat’s
share of major-party candidate spending in the race. We
include the Democratic share of the state’s two-party presidential vote as a control variable.4 We divide the data into
three time periods: the 1980 to 1996 elections; the 2000 and
2004 elections, when the relative share of party spending
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Figure 1 Impact of candidate spending on vote share in senate
elections.
Note: Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals.
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$20 million – nearly a ten-fold increase in less than a
decade. Figure 2 (which shows outside spending in millions of dollars during the last several primary cycles)
demonstrates the consistent increase in outside spending, one which has exceeded the general rate of increase
in overall campaign spending over the last decade. In
each cycle, outside spending by conservative groups has
exceeded liberal outside group spending. We believe the
main reason for that is simply that Republicans have
recently suffered through many more divisive primaries.
Will Rogers famously said, “I am not a member of
any organized political party. I am a Democrat.” However,
at least since 2006, Democrats have strongly rebutted
Rogers’ aphorism. First, in 2006, they installed two topflight strategists, Rep. Rahm Emanuel and Sen. Chuck
Schumer, as chairs of the party’s House and Senate campaign committees. Each committee operated with ruthless
efficiency, acting very early in the cycle to clear primary
fields and starve undesirable candidates of resources.
Cognizant that the road back to a majority ran
largely through rural and exurban districts in Southern
and border states, Emanuel was ruthless about recruiting pro-gun, pro-life candidates who fit their districts –
often to the consternation of the liberal interest groups to
whose idealism he once deemed “f–ing retarded” (Percha
2010). Liberal “netroots” activists lambasted Emanual
for mocking DNC Chair Howard Dean’s 50-state strategy.
But when he successfully took back the House and Nancy
Pelosi became Speaker, one heard nary a peep from progressive interest groups – and the netroots frequently
exalted him (Lambert 2008; Nir 2008).
Schumer was similarly Machiavellian, snubbing
progressive prospective candidates in states such as Missouri and Pennsylvania and instead recruiting moderates
such as deficit hawk Claire McCaskill over more liberal
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Figure 2 Outside spending in House and Senate primary races.
Source: Ref. (Center for Responsive Politics 2012b).

candidates and supporting pro-gun, pro-life Bob Casey
over pro-gun control, pro-choice Barbara Hafer in Pennsylvania (Boyer 2005; Goodman and Gonzalez 2005) The
latter race in particular raised the ire of national women’s
groups (Gandy et al. 2005), but was quickly forgotten
when Schumer engineered the takeover of the Senate.
Conversely, 2010 attempts by Republican Senate Campaign Committee Chair John Cornyn to intervene in primaries – and then not to intervene in 2012 – ended up leaving
him with bloody noses both cycles (Cooper 2010; Siegel
2010; Dallas Morning News 2012; Hawkins 2012).
During the 2008 cycle, Rep. Chris Van Hollen emulated Emanuel’s style, and Schumer remained at the
helm of the Senate Democrats’ campaign arm. And
although 2010 ended up being a Republican tsunami,
Democrats held the Senate. Many observers agree that
this was due to the emergence from primaries of inferior
Republican candidates who made major gaffes during
the fall campaign, such as Nevada’s Sharron Angle, Colorado’s Ken Buck, and Delaware’s Christine (“I’m not a
witch”) O’Donnell. The 2012 cycle was like déjà vu. Selfdestructing candidates like Missouri’s Todd Akin, Indiana’s Richard Mourdock, and Florida’s Connie Mack cost
the Republicans seats that were practically considered
automatic a year before Election Day. As more than a few
pundits noted, these six races alone would have been
enough to flip the Senate (Milbank 2012; Tumulty 2012). It
was no coincidence that several of these candidates were
able to beat establishment-favored candidates in primary
elections. Most of the victors had the support of insurgent
outside groups such as the Club for Growth, the Tea Party
Express, or Jim DeMint’s Senate Conservatives Fund.
We recount this recent history because we believe it
helps explains the direction of outside money in the next
cycle. That is, we anticipate a major acceleration in the
activity of the primary “establishment” Republican independent group, Rove’s Crossroads GPS, in an attempt to
help more electable general election candidates emerge
from primaries (Tumulty 2012). While this could create
tension with Tea Party groups as well as prominent social
conservative groups which generally seek ideological
purity, we believe that the Republican powers-that-be are
unwilling to see the Senate majority slip through their
grasp a third successive time due to the party’s failure to
bring preferred candidates through the primary.
Our final prediction regarding primaries is that
outside group activity will accelerate not only within party
primaries, but also in the primaries of the opposing party.
This would not be unprecedented: California’s Democratic Governor Gray Davis aired $10 million of negative
ads in the 2002 Republican primary in a successful bid to
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eliminate his strongest opponent (Schneider 2002), and
Claire McCaskill did something even sneakier in 2012 by
running faux-negative ads against her preferred Republican opponent (Akin) full of phrases that were designed to
stroke conservative erogenous zones (Catanese 2012).
Based on McCaskill’s success, the frequency with
which ultra-conservative candidates have imploded the
past few cycles, Karl Rove’s historical interest in Democratic primaries (Newsmax 2003), and the increasingly
sophisticated techniques to leverage Big Data and absorb
the id of the other party’s primary electorate, we would not
be surprised to see outside groups on both sides attempt
similar machinations in the 2014 cycle.

Conclusion
Interest group election activity took a quantum leap
forward in the 2012 cycle. Outside spending increased dramatically, primarily in the area of independent advertising
expenditures. We also observe that Super PACs and other
forms of outside spending are moving more heavily into
down-ballot and primary elections. In some cases, Super
PACs blur the distinction between candidates, parties, and
outside groups, due to the flimsy rules on campaign coordination. More generally though, the expansion of outside
spending threatens to outpace the efforts of candidates
and political parties – and, with its unlimited donations
and correspondingly higher salaries, to attract the brightest political minds.
What will interest groups do in future campaigns? As
a model, independent expenditure groups may emulate
New York Mayor Michael Bloomberg, whose newly
created Super PAC spent more than $8 million across six
congressional races in 2012. Bloomberg’s win-loss record
was mixed, as his preferred candidate won in three of
the six contests. In particular, Bloomberg’s Super PAC
spent $3.3 million in the 35th congressional district of
California to oust six-term incumbent Joe Baca, a gunrights Democrat. Bloomberg’s spending in the contest
amounted to three times what was raised by the two candidates, Baca and Gloria Negrete McLeod, a Democratic
state senator (Morain 2012).5 McLeod defeated Baca
by 12% points in the general election. If the national
debate over gun rights has indeed changed in the aftermath of the school massacre in Newtown, Connecticut,
then Michael Bloomberg may be an important source of
5 There were two Democrats contesting the seat due to California’s
recently adopted top-two primary system.
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outside spending in future elections. Longtime political
journalist Tom Edsall (2012 ) describes Bloomberg and
other wealthy Super PAC donors as “ billionaires going
rogue,” since their efforts may work at cross-purposes
with political parties.
We expect independent expenditure groups to continue moving down-ballot into more House races, judicial
campaigns, and other state contests in the next election
cycle, for two reasons. First, both houses of Congress are
narrowly divided and are likely to be in play. When control
of a legislative chamber is at stake, campaign spending
tends to rise. Second and more broadly, trends in campaigns typically begin at the presidential level and work
their way down. That has been true of the professionalization of campaigns, the differentiation and specialization of campaign work, and the increasingly decentralized nature of campaign operations that rely on outside
consultants for most critical tasks. There is no reason to
expect the infusion of independent expenditure money
would operate any differently.
The reaction to the rapid growth in outside spending on
the left has been mixed. In the wake of the 2010 elections,
many progressives seemed to be as flummoxed and ambivalent as Obama himself was when, following the kickoff of
his reelection campaign in early 2011, he reluctantly decided
to bless his former aide Bill Burton’s Priorities USA Action
Super PAC. Some major Democratic donors refused to participate in fundraising outside of the regulated campaign
finance system (MacGillis 2012). “I understand the argument
that the bad guys are using this,” said one Obama bundler.
“But it’s a question of moral standing. We should have said,
‘This is bad for America,’ and we should have appealed to
the American people…. Our side gave in to panic for shortterm gain.” Another mega-donor agreed: “They should
have said no to going [the super PAC] route—it’s disgusting”
(MacGillis 2012).
However, the trend appears to be swinging in the
other direction. Rather than work towards public campaign financing, some progressives have gone elsewhere.
Illinois Democrats, in possession of supermajority control
in both houses but perpetually compelled by survival
instincts, have changed state laws to abolish donation limits in races where outside groups spend over a
certain threshold (Moroni 2012). Though this constitutes
an attempt to ensure their ability to compete with Super
PACs, it may have the unintended consequence of advantaging the Super PAC-aligned candidate even further:
Once the threshold is met, unlimited amounts of money
may be given directly to either candidate, affording the
Super PAC-aligned candidate the ability to raise money
directly from the Super PAC donors.
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Democratic acquiescence to this could be read two
ways: either as acquiescence to the demise of all campaign
regulation, or – given its sponsorship by House Majority
Leader Barbara Flynn Currie (D-Chicago) – a perverse sort
of embrace of the new era with the bravado of Sean Connery’s character from The Untouchables:
You wanna know how to get Capone? They pull a knife, you pull
a gun. He sends one of yours to the hospital, you send one of his
to the morgue. That’s the Chicago way! And that’s how you get
Capone. Are you ready to do that? I’m offering you a deal. Do
you want this deal?

Led by their Chicagoan in the White House, will Democrats nationally set aside their apprehensions to embrace
something like the Chicago Way of financing campaigns?
The current Supreme Court appears poised to relax campaign finance restrictions further in the US. Moreover, a
polarized Congress seems unlikely to pass new campaign
finance legislation, except perhaps for reforms requiring
more disclosure of donors to outside spending groups. If
the 2012 election is any indication of the future, we seem
to be moving toward an “interest group centered” system
of financing federal campaigns (Franz 2013).
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